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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
Plaintiff-Respondent, )
)
-v)
)
ANNA ANNETTE MALLORY,
)
)
)
Defendant-Appellant. )
____________________________________)

NO. 48045-2020
Kootenai County Case No.
CR28-19-8849

APPELLANT’S REPLY
BRIEF

COMES NOW the above-named Defendant-Appellant, ANNA ANNETTE MALLORY, and
hereby respectfully submits this Reply Brief in support of her appeal in the above-entitled matter.
I.
Corrections to, and/or Additional Facts
1. On page 3 of Appellant’s Opening Brief, Appellant recited various quotations from the
testimony of Mr. Stockham concerning Ron Nold, Ms. Mallory’s immediate predecessor as
secretary at the Lodge, and the dire financial straits the Eagles were in following his departure.
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Appellant erroneously omitted any citation to the transcripts for this testimony, and wishes to
clarify this omission now, for the court’s convenience. The correct citations for the testimony
provided is, Stockham, May 7, 2020, Tr. p. 71, L.s 24-25; p. 72, L.s 22-24; p. 73, L.s 15-17; p.
74, L.s 20-25, p. 75, L.s 1-7, and finally, p. 75, L.s 11-15.
2. The allegations in question allegedly occurred during Ms. Mallory’s tenure as secretary of
the Hayden Lake Eagles Aerie. Mr. Stockham, the state’s principal witness described the role of
secretary as follows. He testified that the secretary role is the most demanding, and, (as such), it
is a paid position at the club. The secretary is responsible for taking care of all the membership.
The secretary is responsible for keeping track of all financial records, paying any employees they
have at the club, many times depositing money and keeping track of all those receipts, taking
minutes at all the Eagles meetings, and providing correspondence for the club that comes from
the club’s national and state organizations. Stockham, May 7, 2020, Tr. p. 23, L.s 7-25.
3. The court’s restitution award was based on two items – the amount paid to the Eagles by
Liberty Mutual Insurance, and those relating to petty cash. Omitted were any damages claimed
pertaining to lottery play out of business hours, and discrepancies with regard to the weekly
trustee’s reports. That determination was not appealed by the Eagles, was not briefed by the Eagles,
and should not be at issue here. However, out of an abundance of caution, Ms. Mallory offers the
following factual background and testimony on these issues, should the court wish to consider it.
Otherwise, it may simply be disregarded.
4. Somewhat overlooked in this case, there was a second insurance company who also paid
the Eagles for the alleged misappropriation of funds. Capital Indemnity paid the Eagles in the
neighborhood of $8,200.00, less the $500.00 deductible, and so the Eagles recovered a check for
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about $7,800.00. Stockham, May 7, 2020, Tr. p. 65, L.s 1-5; Stockham, May 8, 2020, Tr. p. 8,
L.s 23-25, p. 9, L.s 1-7, p. 11, L. 11.
5. This second insurance company has not, to the best of of Mr. Stockham’s knowledge, made
demand upon the Eagles to repay that money. Stockham, May 7, 2020, Tr. p. 65, L.s 19-21.
6. Regarding lottery play outside business hours, the court did not rely upon this to form the
basis for the court’s restitution award, and no cross appeal was ever filed. Under the abundance
of caution, Ms. Mallory sets forth the facts bearing upon this assertion, should this court want to
know more.
7. It stands to reason that before one can play a lottery machine, they must access the building.
When asked who had keys and codes to get into the building, Mr. Stockham replied that
typically, just the trustees and employees do; that their “typical” officers did not have access.
When asked if it was in the realm of possibilities that other people, (other than Ms. Mallory),
could have been in after hours, Mr. Stockham responded that, people with a code could go in at
any time. Stockham, May 7, 2020, Tr. p. 62, L.s 10-23.
8. Regarding state’s Exhibit No 5, Clerk’s Record on Appeal, R. pp. 73-74, 203, a
spreadsheet was included entitled “Lottery Play out of Business Hours” that was prepared by Mr.
Stockham. Mr. Stockham was asked whether, for each item listed on state’s Exhibit 5, that he
made sure it was Ms. Mallory’s code that was used to access the building at that particular time,
(keeping in mind there are twenty different entries on the spreadsheet). Mr. Stockham testified
that he could not confirm that each one of those, (the entries), that it was a code Ms. Mallory
entered; but, he claims, that there were several of them that he could pinpoint that would show
she was there. Stockham, May 7, 2020, Tr. p. 43, L.s 7-16.
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9. One particular entry on Mr. Stockham’s spreadsheet immediately stood out to Ms. Mallory.
There was an entry for May 15 at 10:58 a.m. However, Ms. Mallory was not even in the
geographical area of Hayden, Idaho. Her father had passed not even twenty-four hours before
that. Mallory, May 8, 2020, Tr. p. 53, L.s 2-11.
10. With regard to the “big machine”, the main gaming machine, Mr. Stockham was asked if
he was aware that the key to the “big machine” were kept behind the bar, to which he responded,
he was not aware of that, but allowed that anything is possible. Stockham, May 7, 2020, Tr. p.
63, L.s 19-25; Tr. p. 64, L. 1.
11. To his understanding, Mr. Stockham at least infers that Ms. Mallory wanted to get rid of
the big machine, (that sold scratch tickets), because she believed it was causing all of the losses.
Stockham, May 7, 2020, Tr. p. 61, L.s 8-14.
12. Ultimately, the machines were removed. This fact is undisputed.
13. The removal of the machines made a lot of people unhappy. Stockham, May 7, 2020, Tr.
p. 60, L. 25; p. 61, L.s 1-2, p. 62, L.s 6-9.
14. As to discrepancies with regard to the weekly trustee’s reports, although it also did not
form the basis of the court’s restitution award, and has not been raised by way of timely cross
appeal, some of the factual underpinnings of such are discussed herein. The Weekly Trustee’s
Reports can be found at Clerk’s Record Appeal, pp. 88-91.
15. Ms. Mallory discussed why discrepancies occur with regard to the weekly trustee’s
reports. In a nutshell, discrepancies occur when the trustees add into their trustee’s reports money
that did not belong to them, which happened quite often.
16. An example cited to was the trustee’s report for the week ending 7/5/18. Listed on that
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particular report was “room rental” for $1,600.00. The $1,600.00 does not belong to the trustees,
so they are not allowed to include that money in the report as monies received for them. When
this occurs, Ms. Mallory would have to deduct that out. Those types of monies are supposed to
be turned in to the secretary’s office. Mallory, May 8, 2020, Tr. p. 37, L.s 1-25; p. 38, L.s 1-2.
See also, Mallory, May 8, 2020, Tr. p. 40, L.s 4-7.
17. Ms. Mallory would try to reconcile the trustee’s reports with the trustee’s checking
account, but that proved difficult because the trustees never turned in receipts with their reports,
making it difficult to expense out any type of sales. Mallory, May 8, 2020, Tr. p. 39 L.s 17-22.
18. As to the signatures on the reports, Ms. Mallory testified that she, (her signature), is not on
quite a few of them. The reason for this, she explained, is that they were not in balance. Mallory,
May 8, 2020, Tr. p. 38, L.s 5-8.
19. Ms. Mallory discussed this with Doug Smith, Jim Smith and Joe, (believed to be a
reference to Joe Okon). She related that the conversations occurred over and over again. Mallory,
May 8, 2020, Tr. p. 38, L.s 9-12.
20. Unfortunately, nothing was ever done about these alleged improprieties, and so Ms.
Mallory resorted to writing to Grand Aerie. Mallory, May 8, 2020, Tr. p. 38, L.s 5-15, p. 55, L.s
23-25, p. 56, L.s 1-7.
21. Ms. Mallory wrote the letter to Grand Aerie in June of 2018. Mallory, May 8, 2020, Tr. p.
53, L.s 20-25. The point of the letter was that Ms. Mallory wanted to resign her position, the
Lodge was not being run as it should, and she felt the need to disclose this to Grand Aerie.
22. For example, the lottery bag for Ms. Ronda Imus,(the bartender), did not balance several
times, and the issue of monies being deposited into the trustee’s own checking account that did
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not belong to them, and which, under the statutes of Grand Aerie, is not allowed. There is only
allowed to be a petty cash account Mallory, May 8, 2020, Tr. p. 38, L.s 1-25; p. 38, L.s 123-18.
23. Before writing the letter, Ms. Mallory brought matters to several people’s attention,
including Jim Smith, the grand agent for the Lodge.
24. Ms. Mallory related an account where Mr. Jim Smith was asked, in a meeting, about
missing monies, and Mr. Smith reported that it was missing from the bar. Mallory, May 8, 2020,
Tr. p. 55, L.s 11-22.
25. Ms. Mallory wanted an audit done, because she wanted to resign. And so, Terry Steiner of
the Coeur d’Alene Eagles was asked, but he could not do it, Ms. Mallory requested the use of the
auditor for the Marriott, Mike Lundstrom, but he also could not do it. Mallory, May 8, 2020, Tr.
p. 56, L.s 13-25; p. 57, L.s 1-10.
26. Sometime before she left, Ms. Mallory had the locks changed to the secretary’s office. The
reason for this is that prior to changing the locks, people would come in drinking and socializing
in the office, personal items were taken out and brought out to the bar, papers were shuffled
through, etc. Mallory, May 8, 2020, Tr. p. 57, L.s 22-25; p. 58, L.s 1-9. There was certainly no
evidence presented of a nefarious purpose in doing so.
27. Ms. Mallory also noted in testimony that all of the officers had online access to the
accounts. If a member wanted to know the balance of an account, it would be shown to that
person. Additionally, at every business meeting, (held every second Tuesday of the month), the
balances and printouts were provided to allthe interested members. Mallory, May 8, 2020, Tr. p.
58, L.s 11-19.
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Argument
I.
Ambiguities in the Plea Agreement are to be Interpreted in Favor of the Defendant, here
Ms. Mallory, Which Leads to a Result Consistent With Her Intent.
This case involves an ambiguous term, “restitution”, contained in a plea agreement. Our
Supreme Court has explained how an ambiguity in a plea agreement should be dealt with. Here,
as will be shown, Ms. Mallory’s reasonable understanding on the inducement for her to plead
guilty, rests materially on restitution being limited to the burglary charge.
The applicable standard, set forth by the Idaho Supreme Court is as follows:
“Ambiguities in a plea agreement are to be interpreted in favor of the defendant.
“as with other contracts, provisions of plea agreements are occasionally
ambiguous; the government ‘ordinarily must bear responsibility for any lack of
clarity.’” United States v. De la Fuente, 8 F.3d 1333, 1338 (9th Cir. 1993) (quoting
United States v. Read, 778 F.2d 1427, 1441, 9th Cir. 1985)). “[A]mbiguities are
construed in favor of the defendant. Focusing on the defendant’s reasonable
understanding also reflects the proper constitutional focus on what induced the
defendant to plead guilty. De la Fuente, 8 F.3d at 1337 n. 7.”
State v. Peterson, 148 Idaho 593, 226 P.3d 535 (2010). The district court was well aware of its
lack of ability to award restitution for claimed financial losses, and made this point clear to the
parties. (Court, May 7, 2020, Tr. p. 12, L.s 23-25, p. 13, L. 1). Second, shortly after signing the
agreement on February 7, 2020, the prosecution acknowledged in a hearing on February 10,
2020, that it had insufficient evidence to prove the grand theft. This controversy came to a head
in hearings on May 7-8, 2020, when the state indicated it’s intent to go after restitution for the
grand theft charge, which was being dismissed. If she was not agreeable, the state said it would
re-file the grand theft charges. Given the obvious protests made be Ms. Mallory’s counsel, (set
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forth in her opening Brief), it should have been rather apparent that Ms. Mallory was not
contemplating this situation when she initially entered into the agreement. Next is the fact that
Ms. Mallory did not receive a lenient sentencing recommendation, which, if she had, could be
construed as indicating the state would be going after a substantial award of restitution. These
factors, having been discussed in Ms. Mallory’s opening Brief, need not be elaborated on further.
In addition to the foregoing, restitution was to be awarded per the agreement, “if applicable by
statute”. At all times prior to, and including, Ms. Mallory entering into the written agreement,
(the Pre-Trial Settlement Offer), the state had no authority to pursue Ms. Mallory, under the
applicable statute, for claimed losses pertaining to the grand theft charge, (there being no
argument that by simply entering into the agreement, she was intending to give unequivocal
consent to the same). Finally, it bears noting that the restitution clause was drafted by the state,
and ambiguities in a plea agreement are to be interpreted in favor of the defendant.
II.
The District Court Erred and Abused It’s Discretion, by Awarding $10.000.00
Representing Monies Paid by Liberty Mutual Insurance.The district court ordered restitution in favor of the Eagles and against Ms. Mallory in the
amount of $29,781.79. Clerk’s Record on Appeal, pp. 240-252. The apparent basis for this
particular dollar amount was (1) the amount of the claim submitted to the Liberty Mutual
Insurance Company, by Mr. Stockham, in the amount of $29,781.79, (which amount had not
been adjusted for a $2,500.00 deductible), and/or based the proof of loss submitted by Mr.
Stockham, and/or upon the second amended restitution memorandum submitted to the Court,
totaling $29,781.79. Clerk’s Record Appeal, pp. 68-70, 71-72, 156-157. The second amended
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restitution request included the $10,000.00 payment which was paid to the Eagles by Liberty
Mutual.
This award flies in the face of the state’s testimony on this point, as well as the State’s legal
position before this court.
On direct exam before the district court, Mr.Stockham, the state’s principal witness, was
asked, of the $29,781.79, how much they were out of pocket, given the $10,000.00 payment
made to the Eagles by Liberty Mutual. He testified unequivocally in response, that the amount
was $19,781.79. Stockham, May 7, 2020, Tr. p. 45, L.s 3-9. (Again, this does not take into
account the $2,500.00 deductible). Mr. Stockham testified further that he believed Liberty
Mutual would be seeking their own restitution award for the $10,000.00 payment. Stockham,
May 7, 2020, Tr. p. 40, L.s 11-15. Mr. Stockham also testified that to hjs knowledge, Liberty
Mutual was not seeking to recoup the $10,000.00 payment it made from the Eagles, but rather,
assumed they probably were seeking it from the court. Stockham, May 7, 2020, Tr. p. 40, L.s 2225, p. 50, L.s 1-7.
In addition to the testimony from Mr. Stockham on direct examination, the State admits, in
it’s Response Brief before this court, that the only party to be paid restitution was the Eagles
Club, for the reason that the Eagles were the only party expressly mentioned in the restitution
clause of the Pre-Trial Settlement Offer accepted by Ms. Mallory. Respondent’s Brief, p. 8, (for
the Pre-Trial Settlement Offer, please see Clerk’s Record on Appeal, p. 155).
Thus, both the State’s argument, and State’s testimony, shows the court erred in awarding the
additional $10,000.00 in regards to Liberty Mutual’s payment thereof. Liberty Mutual has never
sought their own award in court, by way of making appropriate proofs as to their entitlement to
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all or part of the $10,000.00. The two restitution orders can be found at Clerk’s Record on
Appeal, pp. 249-252, one for $19,781.79, and the second for $10,000.00.
III.
There is No Substantial and Competent Evidence to Support a Claim for the Recovery of
Valid Petty Cash Checks.
The single largest category of claimed losses is petty cash checks. Plaintiff’s Exhibit 3,
Clerk’s Record on Appeal, p. 165.
Mr. Stockham’s largest complaint appears to be that at times, there were one or two signatures
on the front of the check, rather than three. Stockham, May 7, 2020,Tr. P. 53, Ln.s 8-15.
However, even assuming less than the required number of signatures was obtained, against
protocol, it still is not substantial and competent evidence of theft. A closer look at Exhibit 3,
(Clerk’s Record on Appeal, p. 165), reveals the following:
Of the thirteen checks on Mr. Stockham’s spreadsheet, four were signed by both Ms. Mallory,
and Mr. Sadlir, the Secretary and Treasurer, And, An additional check was signed by Ms.
Mallory, and Mr. Doug Smith. Stockham, May 7, 2020, Tr. p. 54, L.s 14-16; Clerk’s Record on
Appeal, pp. 75-87, 166-178.
Another check on the list bore the signatures of Ms. Mallory, Mike Sadlir, and Jim Smith.
Clerk’s Record on Appeal, 75-87, 166-178.
Thus, of the thirteen Petty Cash checks complained of by Mr. Stockham, totaling $17,228.94,
Mr. Stockham’s own spreadsheet shows that $9,100.00 in Petty Cash checks were signed by at
least two or (in the one case three), people with authority at the Eagles. Mr. Stockham
acknowledged in his testimony that many of the checks bore one or two signatures. Stockham,
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May 7, 2020, Tr. P. 52 L.s 23-25. He further acknowledged that when a check bore two
signatures, somebody else with authority at the Eagles put the second signature on it. Stockham,
May 7, 2020, Tr. p. 53, L.s 1-5.
Mr. Stockham’s concern over not following correct procedure with regard to having three
signatures on each check in essence means that Mr. Sadlir and Mr. Doug Smith were also not
following correct protocol by ensuring that each and every check bore three signatures. The
check signed by Ms. Mallory, Mike Sadlir, and Doug Smith did bear three signatures but is
included on Mr. Stockham’s spreadsheet nonetheless. Mr. Doug Smith was the president or vice
president at the time; Mr. Jim Smith was the grand agent at the tme. Stockham, May 8, 2020, Tr.
p. 11, L.s 19-25, p. 12, L.s 1-10. Stockham, May 8, 2020, Tr. p. 11, L.s ,17-19 Stockham, May 8,
2020, Tr. p.12, L.s 1-10. Mr.Stockham also acknowledges the possibility that three people were
not always available to sign a check. Stockham, May 7, 2020, Tr. p. 54, L.s 17-19. But he again
simply falls back to his “policy” argument that three signatures had to be obtained. Stockham,
May 7, 2020, Tr. p. 54, L.s 17-21; Stockham, May 8, 2020, Tr. p. 12, L.s 22-25.
As noted earlier, the mere failure to follow correct protocol does not equate to substantial and
competent evidence of theft. When asked directly how he, (Mr. Stockham), knew that Ms.
Mallory kept the money from the listed petty cash checks, he admitted that as a matter of
certainty, there was no evidence exactly what Ms. Mallory did. Stockham, May 7, 2020, Tr. p.53,
L.s 18-22. Mr. Stockham goes on to express a pure assumption, that because Ms. Mallory was
the person responsible for signing the back of the checks (three signatures are not required on the
back of the checks), the checks were cashed, and the cash is missing, that Ms. Mallory must
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have stolen the money. Stockham, May 7, 2020, Tr. p. 53, L.s 22-24 1. The simple fact that Mr.
Stockham cannot account for how the petty cash was used is also not proof at all that any sort of
theft occurred.
Mr. Stockham discusses an Idaho Lottery check dated June 22, 2018, in support of his claims.
Stockham, May 7, 2020, Tr. p.55, L.s 16-20; state’s Exhibit 3, Clerk’s Record on Appeal, p. 7587, 166-178. Mr. Stockham was asked if the check was cashed and a cashier’s check in the
appropriate amount sent off of to the Idaho State Lottery. Mr. Stockham said he could not speak
to that. Stockham, May 7, 2020, Tr. p. 56, L.s 11-16. He was willing to admit that it was
possible, though he thought not probable. Stockham, May 7, 2020, Tr. p. 56, L.s 17-20.
Apparently, in a normal setting, the money would be deposited into their account and the Lottery
pulls money directly out of it. Stockham, May 7, 2020, Tr. p. 56, L.s 22-25. When asked if the
Lottery Commission could possibly have demanded a check be sent, (in lieu of the normal
method of payment), such as a cashier’s check, Mr. Stockham said that it was potentially
possible. The reason being that the Eagles were bouncing money left and right, and he was sure
that they, (the Lottery Commission), were demanding that they got their money. Stockham, May
7, 2020, Tr. p. 57, L.s 6-12. Ultimately, he said he had no knowledge of these matters. Stockham,
May 7, 2020, Tr. p. 57, L.s 17-20.
Mr. Stockham testified that some of the petty cash could have been used for events. And that
one check on his list for $1,500.00 matched up perfectly to the time they had a big convention.
Stockham, May 7, 2020, Tr. p.58, L.s 3-7. The precise number and timing of the various events
1

Mr. Sadlir solely endorsed the back of 6/14/2018 check; the 8/16/2018 check was not cashed
but appears to bear an endorsement of Lowe’s. Thus, it is inaccurate to assert Ms. Mallory
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held has not been specified; nor is it clear exactly what money may have been collected after the
event and re-deposited into the accounts and/or utilized for some other valid petty cash
expenditures.
Mr. Stockham acknowledges that he could not speak exactly as to whether petty cash was
given to the bar to cover expenses, but asserted that is not how the Eagles do business. He did say
however, that the bar does need to have cash to be able to break and make change. Stockham,
May 8, 2020, Tr. p. 26, L.s 20-25; Tr. p. 27, L.s 1-6.
On Exhibit 4, Clerk’s Record on Appeal, pp. 16 5, 75-87, 166-178, approved by the trustees,
there is a category for weekly expenses, including a variety of items petty cash could have been
used for. Ronda, the bar manager, had expenses during the week such as running to Walmart, or
other petty cash things and so, they would pull from the petty cash account for these purchases.
These monies were supplied by the secretary. When the trustees did their weekly reports, they
would expense out the petty cash used, but they were never paying that back to the secretary’s
office. Mallory, May 8, 2020, Tr. p. 40, L.s 15-20. When looking at the trustee’s weekly reports,
one can see many of the trustee’s expenses which may or may not have been paid for through
their petty cash. The list includes, but is not limited to, gaming machines, popcorn, tacos,
burgers, bar misc., hold’em dealer, misc. purchases, games, burger bag set up, food services,
office depot, auxillary, beer, liquor, cleaning, key, entertainment, kitchen, atm, and state
convention.
Procedurally, the trustees would always keep $3,000.00 in their own account. The trustees
would collect all the money from the social room from the bar, and then take whatever money
endorsed and cashed all the checks.
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they felt they needed for expenses, without providing invoices, expense receipts, and whatever
was left over after that, they gave to the secretary’s office. Mallory, May 8, 2020, Tr. p. 41, L.s
1-7; L.s 11-14. Regarding the $3,000.00 figure, whatever the trustees are short in their account,
(of the $3,000.00), the trustees deduct it out and whatever remains they turn over to the secretary
to pay bills and whatnot, and for payroll, though maintaining their own checking account is
against Grand Aerie bylaws. Mallory, May 8, 2020, Tr. p. 45, L.s 3-21. Ronda Imus at the bar
also had a petty cash budget which was $500.00, and she maintained a ”lottery bag” which was
kept at $600.00 at all times. When Ms. Imus turned in her claimed expenses, Ms. Mallory would
replenish the amount. Mallory, May 8, 2020, Tr. p. 51 L.s 19-25. Additionally, when there was a
convention, in one case, Ms. Imus was given $4,000.00 to maintain four separate registers, plus
backup. Ms. Mallory does not know what became of that money because Ronda never turned
anything back in. Mallory, May 8, 2020, Tr. p. 52, L.s 4-11.
One specific example of a discrepancy was that the trustee’s included an amount of $1,600.00
for “room rental”. The has nothing to do with sales receipts, and should not be included in the
trustee’s reports. Ms. Mallory explains precisely why the $1,600.00 for room rental did not
belong to the trustees. Mallory, May 8, 2020, Tr. p. 43, L.s 7-15.
The importance of being very accurate in utilizing the correct account for a particular item lies
in the government reporting requirements. These things must be reported to the Internal Revenue
Service and Department of Revenue. Mallory, May 8, 2020, Tr. p. 43, L.s 24-25; p. 44, L.s 1-3.
Ms. Mallory did not prepare the weekly trustee’s reports. Only the trustees do. Mallory, May 8,
2020, Tr. p. 44, L.s 9-13.
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IV.
The Prosecution Clearly Admitted it had Insufficient Evidence to Prove the Charge of
Grand Theft.
The state, beyond the outer bounds of credibility, urges this court to believe that the prosecutor
did not admit the grand theft charge could not be proven. This proposition is preposterous.
Rather than going back and forth with the state over the plain meaning of the wording used by
the prosecutor, the court is invited to review the statements as have been transcribed by the
official court reporter. The exact wording used can be found at Poorman, February 10, 2020. Tr.
p. 6, L.s 15-19. The state goes on to argue that no charge would have been filed in the face of
inadequate evidence to prove it, and the grand theft charge was only dismissed through ordinary
plea negotiations. This entire argument seems to be a rather transparent attempt to justify
“strong-arming” Ms. Mallory into agreeing to an expanded meaning and scope of the term
“restitution”, so as to include dismissed charges, after the prosecution had earlier admitted to the
insufficiency of the evidence to prove the charge of grand theft. Specifically, the prosecutor’s
comments were as follows: “I would want to make it very clear so that there’s no confusion later
that Ms. Mallory understands, I will re-file the grand theft charge and seek restitution for the
entire criminal conduct that has been disclosed. So I just want to make sure she understands that.
Nivison, May 7, 2020, Tr. p. 14, L.s 4-9.
The state next argues that even if the prosecution did admit the state could not prove the theft
beyond a reasonable doubt, it would not prevent the parties from consenting to restitution or
prevent the state from proving restitution by a reasonable doubt. Taking these propositions in
reverse order, contrary to its position, the state would have been prevented from proving
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restitution by a reasonable doubt. The district court correctly recognized this. At the May 7, 2020
hearing, the court noted that the statue does not allow it to award restitution to victims who are
not the victims of the adjudicated conduct. Court, May 7, 2020, Tr. p. 12, L.s 23-25. The court
further added that it’s reading of the statute is very clear that unless the defendant agrees or
consents to an award of restitution to the Hayden Lake Eagles as part of this criminal case, that
the court does not have jurisdiction to enter that requested restitution award. Court, May 7, 2020,
Tr. p. 13, L.s 4-9.
V.
Ms. Mallory’s “Consent” to Restitution Beyond the Push Lawnmower is Invalid, Being a
Product of State Coercion.
The state also argues that even if the claim that the prosecutor had admitted he could not
prove the theft beyond a reasonable doubt were true, it would not prevent the parties from
consenting to restitution. In this case however, there was no valid consent. Our appellate courts
have long recognized the manner in which to address situations whereby there is an ambiguous
term to the agreement between the state and a defendant. For example, our Supreme Court has
said:
The law has long since recognized that, a criminal defendant by pleading guilty waives
certain constitutional rights including, the privilege against self incrimination.  Waiver of these
constitutional rights will be upheld if the entire record shows the waiver was made voluntarily,
knowingly, and intelligently. State v. Cope, 142 Idaho 492, 129 P. 3d. 1241 (2006).
Ms. Mallory asserts that her consent to an almost unlimited restitution award was not made
voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. The obvious reason for this is that the prosecution had,
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previous to this, stated that it, (the prosecution), had insufficient evidence to prove the charge of
grand theft. This was an important inducement for Mallory to plead guilty. The state’s later
change of heart is extremely troublesome. Suffice it to say Ms. Mallory carried out her portion of
the bargain; the state misled Ms. Mallory and rendered the agreement potentially null and void,
and indeed unconscionable. However, to be clear, Ms. Mallory does not seek to withdraw her
plea, only to have the state live up to it’s agreement regarding a reasonable interpretation of the
term “restitution”.. And most certainly, not use “consent” as a basis for relief in these
proceedings.
VI.
Ms. Mallory did not get a Lenient Sentencing Recommendation.
The consideration of whether a person received a “lenient sentence” recommendation arises
from State v. Shafer, 144 Idaho 370, 161 P.3d 689 (Ct. App. 2007). It is a factor when there is an
ambiguous term in the parties’ plea agreement, and the court must infer the parties’ intent from
the circumstances. Shafer, 144 Idaho at 374. In Shafer, Mr. Shafer entered into a plea agreement
to plead guilty, pay a fine, write an apology letter and to pay restitution in an amount to be
determined. The state agreed to recommend a withheld judgment, a thirty day jail sentence, of
which half could be served as community service and the other half served on weekends, and
three years of probation.
The Shafer court explained that, “ Shafer received an extremely lenient sentencing
recommendation from the State. In the absence of his agreement to pay a significant amount of
restitution, there was very little consideration for the State’s concessions.” Shafer, 144 Idaho at
375.
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Now, compare and contrast the present case from Shafer. In Mallory’s case, she entered into a
plea agreement with the underlying sentence to be left open, (which evolved into an a
recommendation for an eight year sentence – three years fixed and five years indeterminate),
(Poorman, February 10, 2020, Tr. p. 5, L.s 18-25, p. 6, L.s 1-3), a recommendation for suspended
jail time, (Clerk’s Record on Appeal, p. 155), and in addition thereto, and also recommended
restitution if applicable per statute, tbd to Hayden Lake Eagles. The state’s further
recommendation, not mentioned in the plea agreement was for supervised probation for three
years, (Poorman, February 10, 2020, Tr. p. 5, L.s 20-25, p. 6, L.s 1-3, p. 7. L.s 3-6), which was
one more year than would normally be expected. Under any analysis, this would not constitute a
lenient sentencing recommendation by the state, under the analysis of the Shafer case.
VII.
Ms. Mallory Did Strenuously Object to the Restitution Requested by the State.
The state acknowledges that Ms. Mallory did object to the restitution requested by the state.
Response Brief, p. 9. Where the state errs in it’s reasoning however, is by assuming the only
relevance of this protest is to establish that there was no meeting of the minds. Under the Shafer
decision however, the court noted that, “Perhaps most significantly, when the prosecutor
presented it’s evidence of the other driver’s losses at sentencing, Shafer did not contest the
claimed restitution as a matter of law, but indicated only that he need time to review the State’s
documents. He also made no protest when the district court commented that the restitution was,
“going to be a very substantial amount under any circumstances,” and ordered Shafer to begin
paying at $100 a month.” Thus, the Shafer court used the lack of protest as a factor to determine
the ultimate intent of the parties to the plea agreement, not simply to reach the conclusion there
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had been no meeting of the minds. The repeated protests of Ms. Mallory to the inclusion of
restitution for the dismissed charge of grand theft therefore, bears directly upon her intent with
respect to her agreement with the state.
VIII.
Re: Mallory’s Decision to Leave Her Guilty Plea Intact and Proceed with the
Determination of the Amount of Restitution Owed.
In Brief, the state has argued that “She, (Ms. Mallory), is therefore bound by her subsequent
decision to leave her guilty plea intact and to proceed with the determination of the amount of
restitution owed.” Respondent’s Brief, p. 10. The state completely misinterprets Ms. Mallory’s
position in these proceedings.
Ms. Mallory has not raised any challenge to her decision to leave her guilty plea intact. This
appeal concerns itself only with two questions: (1) Were the Eagles entitled to restitution for the
dismissed charges; and, (2) Was the amount of restitution ordered correct. It is pointless to debate
further the question of whether she is bound to her decision to leave her guilty plea intact. That
was not raised as an issue, and so, was not briefed by Ms. Mallory.
IX.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Ms. Mallory respectfully requests the restitution award be vacated.
DATED this 20th day of May, 2021.
RICHARD K. KUCK, PLLC
___________________________________
RICHRAD K. KUCK Attorney for Mallory
ISB No. 3875
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